Modi magic or Kashmir - What matters more to India’s foreign policy?
text_fieldsOver the last week, there have been two narratives to follow with regards to India’s success in managing its foreign affairs.
Narrative One: Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s popularity as an international leader got another boost as he concluded his visit to Japan, Papua New Guinea and Australia. He was in Japan as PM Fumio Kishida’s invitee to the G-7 summit. Apart from a photo op with Ukranian President Zelensky, there was US President Biden joking about how he would need Modi’s autograph. At Papua New Guinea, their Prime Minister James Marape, added to the awe by touching Modi’s feet. And finally in Sydney, at a public event, the Australian PM Anthony Albanese, called Modi ‘the Boss’, for his ability to draw greater crowds than most rock stars.
Narrative Two: At the recently concluded 3rd Tourism Working Group (TWG) meeting of the G20 nations in Srinagar, while most nations attended, a significant group gave the event a miss. Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and more surprisingly Egypt and Oman, stayed away, because the meet was held in Kashmir. It was a show of ‘Islamic solidarity’ with Pakistan, and its position of claiming that Jammu and Kashmir is a disputed territory. To some extent, it did catch India off-guard.
Both narratives are valid one would say, but which should matter more? Yes, the Prime Minister’s popularity is a plus, for Modi personally. It is also great material for Instagram reels and ra-ra news channel discussions. And it has raised India’s profile at international meets, where Modi’s presence is always a talking point. Even though India has had a wealth of charismatic Prime Ministers, from Pandit Nehru to Indira to Vajpayee, it’s undoubted that Modi, has upped the ante. But should the Prime Minister’s massive personal appeal be counted as a foreign policy success? Is it the ‘substance’ of India’s foreign policy? I would argue that it is not. But Kashmir is. Kashmir has for long been one of the cornerstones of India’s foreign policy.
India has invested a lot of energy and diplomacy in trying to isolate Pakistan and its view that Jammu and Kashmir is disputed territory. Most of the world does accept India’s position, or stays neutral, and sticks to uttering the placebo statements of asking both countries to maintain peace and dialogue over J&K. But among Islamic countries, and across the middle-east, Pakistan has been able to drum up support and sympathy for its stand. So for India, it has always been a major diplomatic aim to wean as many Arab and middle-eastern countries as it can, away from the Pakistan viewpoint.
No shows at G20
Certainly, India does have every right to invite foreign dignitaries to J&K. It is even an important signal to send. In fact India, which assumed the G20 forum’s presidency in December 2022, chose to organise G20-related events in J&K and Arunachal Pradesh to showcase ‘normalcy and development’ there, and to undermine the territorial claims by Pakistan and China respectively over the two territories. Pakistan naturally objected to the Kashmir meet. Expectedly, in solidarity, China too boycotted the event. China also stayed away from a G20 event in Arunachal Pradesh, since it claims the state as a part of southern Tibet.
For India, this G20 meet was significant because it was the biggest international event held in J&K since the abrogation of Article 370 in August 2019. It was a statement to the world that J&K is an integral part of India. The expectation may have been to split the response of Middle East, but that did not happen. As mentioned earlier, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and even ‘friendlier’ Egypt and Oman - closed ranks and skipped the meet. Indonesia too, just sent officials from its Delhi embassy.
It may be argued that India’s bilateral equations with all these countries remain robust, and that many of them are obliged to pay lip service to the broad Arab nation stand on Kashmir. But the fact is, they did not turn up. A direct snub. Which means that despite Modi's personal equations with the leaders of these nations, when it comes to Kashmir, for India’s diplomats, there's still a long way to go.
It is also worth noting that Modi’s Japan, Papua New Guinea and Australia trip, wasn’t very challenging diplomatically. India is a natural ally for Japan and Australia to counter China in the region. In fact both countries are banking on India’s longer recent history of antagonism with China, to take more initiative at baiting and counter-balancing the Chinese, both in words and action. So, naturally both gave Modi the full ‘feel-good’ treatment. Biden too sees Modi as critical to USA’s China policy. Biden also knows that boosting Modi’s ego with gimmicks like the ‘autograph’ remark, suits the Prime Minister’s PR machinery at home, and is a ‘low cost’ way of keeping Modi and India on USA’s side.
On the other hand, let’s remind ourselves about the significance of our relationship with the Arab nations who stayed away from Srinagar. Take Saudi Arabia, which is India’s fourth largest trade partner, after USA, China and UAE. In 2021-22, our trade with Saudi Arabia was worth $42.8 billion, with 18% of India’s oil and 22% of our LPG coming from here. In comparison, India's trade with Australia stood at $25 billion in 2021-22, and at $20.57 billion with Japan. Significant, but Saudi Arabia is clearly the bigger fish and an important equation to maintain.
With Turkey, India has struggled over the decades. Turkey has repeatedly spoken in support of Pakistan’s stance on Kashmir, even at the United Nations. India did a major ‘soft’ reach-out recently with ‘Operation Dost’ after the massive earthquake in Turkey and Syria, sending relief and medical supplies in huge quantities along with disaster management experts. But with Turkey skipping Srinagar, clearly that gesture was not enough.
Egypt was India’s special invitee to the Srinagar G20 event. President El-Sisi was the chief guest at our Republic Day parade this year, and Army chief General Manoj Pande visited Egypt just a week ago. India also hopes to sell Egypt 70 Tejas light combat aircraft, along with military helicopters. Also, China now has a naval base in Djibouti, which can threaten the $200 billion worth of Indian goods that sail through the Suez Canal annually. So India has a massive stake in Egypt’s security, and needs to keep working on this relationship too.
Lastly, Oman. Considering that the PM visited Oman in 2018, that India is the second largest market for its oil, and that it is India’s closest defence partner in the Gulf, it’s surprising that Oman too gave Srinagar a miss. And so, yes its back to the drawing board with Oman as well.
In closing, the broad takeaway is roughly this - Yes, we should cheer for the adulation that Modi gets almost everywhere he goes. But his popularity is not a substitute for the hard yards that must be run when it comes to dealing with India’s trickiest diplomatic challenge, Jammu and Kashmir.