The Kerala High Court, quoting an ‘Ayat’ (verse) from the Quran, ruled last month that a divorced Muslim woman is entitled to seek maintenance from her former husband even if he has already met his obligations under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. The court set aside a family court order that had denied maintenance to a divorced woman on the grounds that her ex-husband had already complied with Muslim personal law requirements.
Justice Kauser Edappagath, while hearing a revision petition, was examining a 2012 order of the Palakkad family court, which had rejected the woman’s claim for maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC. The family court had reasoned that since the husband had discharged his liabilities under the 1986 Act, the woman could not seek further maintenance under the secular law.
The High Court observed that the Quran, regarded as the primary source of Muslim law, places an obligation on a Muslim husband to make a fair provision for his divorced wife. Referring to Ayat 241, the court noted that the verse mandates a reasonable provision for divorced women, in addition to dower, as a religious duty, Indian Express reported.
The court took note that the couple had married in January 2010 and divorced in July of the same year through talaq. On the day of divorce, they had entered into an agreement stating that the husband had paid ₹35,000 for the iddat period and ₹1 lakh as matah, and that the wife would not claim maintenance in the future. While the family court later granted maintenance to the child, it rejected the woman’s claim based on this agreement and the payments already made.
Advocates G Sreekumar and K Ravi appearing for the woman argued that a divorced Muslim woman’s right to claim maintenance under Section 125 CrPC does not automatically cease merely because amounts were paid under the 1986 Act.
They contended that the family court should have examined whether the sums paid were sufficient for her sustenance and whether she was capable of maintaining herself. It was further argued that the ₹1 lakh paid as matah was grossly inadequate to secure her future livelihood, especially considering she was young at the time of divorce.
Opposing the plea, advocate CM Kammappu for the husband maintained that once the husband had fulfilled his obligations under both statutory and personal law, no further maintenance claim under the CrPC was maintainable.
The High Court observed that the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 is a declaratory statute that codifies and recognises pre-existing principles of Muslim law. It noted that Parliament, while enacting the law, intended to ensure that a divorced woman receives sufficient means for her livelihood after divorce, and that the term “provision” signifies something meant to meet her future needs.
Finding that the family court had failed to assess both the adequacy of the amount paid and the woman’s ability to support herself, the High Court set aside the earlier order. The bench expressed difficulty in accepting that a one-time payment of ₹1 lakh could constitute a lifetime provision for a woman who was 17 years old at the time of divorce.
Accordingly, the matter was remanded to the Palakkad family court for fresh consideration of the woman’s maintenance claim in accordance with law. The High Court also directed the family court to reconsider the quantum of maintenance awarded to the minor child and to dispose of the matter expeditiously, noting that the proceedings had been pending since 2010.
The court further noted that the 1986 Act does not expressly override the remedy available under Section 125 CrPC. Referring to binding precedents, it observed that rights under secular maintenance law and personal law operate in distinct but co-existing domains and must be harmoniously interpreted.
The bench clarified that if a husband opposes a maintenance claim, he must demonstrate not only that he has complied with his personal law obligations but also that the divorced woman is financially capable of maintaining herself in light of those payments.
Justice Edappagath also emphasised that the concept of “reasonable and fair provision” under the 1986 Act is meant to secure a divorced woman’s future livelihood and cannot be reduced to a mere token payment.