"Walking is man's best medicine. If you are in a bad mood, go for a walk. If you are still in a bad mood, go for another walk." — Hippocrates
Walking is humanity's oldest and most natural mode of movement. Long before the invention of the wheel transformed travel, human beings walked—to work, worship, protest, and dream. The Supreme Court in Maniyar Iliyaz @ Shaik Riyaz v. P. Ayyappan (decided on 19 June 2026) has transformed a father's tragic loss of his five-year-old son, crushed by a tanker while walking to school on a road without a footpath, into a constitutional milestone. While deciding a motor accident claim, the Court elevated a pedestrian's right to walk on safe, demarcated footpaths to the status of a fundamental right under Part III of the Constitution. The judgment is not merely another road safety decision; it is an act of constitutional restoration and civilizational correction.
The decision builds on the Supreme Court's evolving road safety jurisprudence. In S. Rajaseekaran, the Court issued comprehensive road safety guidelines. In In Re: Phalodi Accident (2026), it took suo motu cognisance of multiple fatal highway accidents and directed improvements in highway safety, removal of encroachments, and emergency response systems. Similarly, Gyan Prakash v. Union of India (2025) emphasised the obligation of authorities to eliminate encroachments affecting road safety. Maniyar Iliyaz carries this jurisprudence a decisive step further by recognising pedestrians not as incidental road users but as constitutional rights holders.
What's the Ruling?
The central constitutional question before the Court was profound: does the freedom of movement guaranteed under Article 19(1)(d) belong only to those travelling on wheels, or does it first and foremost protect the pedestrian? The Court answered with remarkable constitutional clarity. It held that the right to walk forms an inseparable part of Articles 19(1)(d) and 21 and is further reinforced by the freedoms of speech, assembly, and association under Articles 19(1)(a), (b), and (c). Walking is not merely a means of movement; it is the most elementary expression of human liberty.
The Court's reasoning is firmly rooted in established constitutional jurisprudence. In Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, the Supreme Court held that Article 21 includes the right to livelihood, affirming that the right to life extends beyond mere animal existence. In Francis Coralie Mullin and Bandhua Mukti Morcha, the Court recognised dignity as the heart of Article 21. Maniyar Iliyaz extends this constitutional philosophy to pedestrian movement. Safe footpaths are no longer viewed as matters of administrative convenience but as indispensable conditions for living with dignity. A parent walking a child to school should not be compelled to gamble with life because the State failed to provide basic pedestrian infrastructure.
Perhaps the judgment's most transformative declaration is that the right to walk necessarily includes the right to safe, well-demarcated, and properly maintained footpaths. This right is primary and must receive priority over motorised movement. In doing so, the Court challenges the long-standing dominance of motor vehicles in urban planning and constitutional discourse. For decades, public roads have largely been designed for vehicles while pedestrians have been forced into dangerous spaces or displaced altogether. The judgment restores the constitutional balance by recognising that roads belong first to people.
The Court further held that this constitutional right imposes corresponding duties upon urban development authorities, municipal corporations, municipalities, and panchayats. Drawing upon the Hohfeldian principle that every right carries a correlative duty, it declared that these authorities are constitutionally obligated to demarcate, construct, maintain, and protect pedestrian infrastructure wherever roads exist. A breach of this obligation is not merely an administrative lapse but a constitutional wrong capable of being remedied through writ jurisdiction as well as through civil remedies under the Specific Relief Act, independent of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
The Motor Vehicles Act: A Critique
The verdict is equally significant for its critique of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Tracing its legislative origins to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, the Court observed that the statutory framework has consistently treated the vehicle—not the human being—as its central concern. Although the Motor Vehicles (Driving) Regulations, 2017 require drivers to exercise caution towards pedestrians, they merely regulate driver behaviour; they neither recognise the pedestrian's constitutional entitlement to safe footpaths nor accord it primacy. The Court therefore characterizes the absence of pedestrian infrastructure as a civilizational failure requiring constitutional correction rather than legislative indifference.
The decision also exposes a significant statutory vacuum. Unlike environmental protection, where Parliament enacted comprehensive legislation and regulatory mechanisms, pedestrian rights remain without an independent legal framework. While the Constitution now recognises the right, its effective realisation requires legislation identifying duty bearers, prescribing enforceable standards, establishing expeditious remedies, and creating a dedicated regulatory authority for planning and monitoring pedestrian infrastructure. Constitutional recognition alone cannot ensure meaningful implementation.
Walking as a Cultural Practice
Equally compelling is the Court's recognition that walking occupies a unique place in India's constitutional and cultural heritage. Throughout Indian history, walking has been an instrument of devotion, expression, association, and social transformation. The Nagar Sankirtan, the Pandharpur Wari, and the Kanwar Yatra demonstrate how walking becomes an exercise of religious freedom, assembly, and community life. Mahatma Gandhi's Dandi March transformed a simple walk into one of history's greatest acts of civil disobedience, while Acharya Vinoba Bhave's Bhoodan Movement carried the message of social justice across thousands of kilometres on foot. These traditions affirm that walking is not merely physical movement but an exercise of multiple constitutional freedoms protected under Article 19.
The judgment also fits comfortably within the Supreme Court's broader constitutional jurisprudence. Just as Subhash Kumar recognised the right to clean water and Vellore Citizens' Welfare Forum integrated environmental principles into Article 21, Maniyar Iliyaz recognises a safe pedestrian environment as an essential component of life with dignity. The Court's decision to convert the dispute into proceedings under Article 32, renaming it Re: Fundamental Right to Walk and Footpath, demonstrates its determination to transform an individual tragedy into a matter of enduring constitutional importance.
Challenges and Future Questions
The verdict nevertheless raises important questions for future governance. Does Article 19(1)(d) impose positive obligations upon the State to create pedestrian infrastructure? How should this right be balanced against financial limitations, municipal autonomy, and competing demands on public resources? Can courts impose extensive affirmative duties without express legislative authorisation? These concerns deserve careful consideration. Yet resource constraints cannot be invoked to deny the very existence of a fundamental right. The Constitution binds every organ of the State—legislature, executive, and judiciary—to progressively realise fundamental freedoms rather than postpone them indefinitely.
Ultimately, Maniyar Iliyaz represents a constitutional reordering of public space. It rejects the assumption that roads primarily belong to motor vehicles and restores the pedestrian to the centre of constitutional concern. By declaring the right to walk on safe footpaths as fundamental, enforceable, and entitled to priority, the Supreme Court has reimagined the constitutional geography of Indian streets.
The Constitution promises liberty, equality, and the dignity of the individual. Those promises cannot be fulfilled unless citizens can move safely on foot. There is no meaningful liberty without the freedom to walk, and no genuine dignity where walking itself becomes hazardous. The enduring legacy of Maniyar Iliyaz lies in ensuring that these constitutional promises are realised not merely in courtrooms but on the footpaths—and on the roads still waiting for footpaths—across every city, town, and village in India.
(Dr. Pauly Mathew Muricken is a lawyer, writer and academic based in Kochi.)