A woman found her way out of a case instituted against her, which pertained to the alleged use of abusive language against Jesus, thereby hurting the religious sentiments of the Christian community and intending to outrage religious feelings; the same having been found legally untenable by the Jharkhand High Court, the court consequently quashed the FIR and the ensuing criminal proceedings.

The order, delivered on February 20 by Justice Anil Kumar Choudhary, constitutes a pointed judicial reminder that criminal law cannot be invoked in the absence of the essential statutory ingredients that sustain an offence, The Indian Express reported.

The court, while examining the plea seeking quashment of the FIR, held that there was no allegation that the petitioner had acted deliberately, maliciously, and intentionally to outrage the religious feelings of any class of citizens—an indispensable requirement under Section 299 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita.

The prosecution had arraigned the woman under Sections 292, 299 and 302 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, as well as Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, alleging that she had posted “filthy language” on social media, insulting Lord Jesus and thereby disturbing communal harmony, including among adherents of the Sarna faith. The informant asserted that the post had wounded the sentiments of the Christian community at large.

However, the court found a conspicuous evidentiary vacuum. It noted that there was no assertion that anyone other than the informant had even viewed the impugned post, nor any allegation that the religious feelings of any broader class of citizens had in fact been outraged.

The absence of such averments, the bench observed, eviscerated the substratum of the offence under Section 299, which demands proof of deliberate and malicious intent directed at a class of persons.

Equally infirm, in the court’s analysis, was the charge under Section 292 of the BNS relating to public nuisance. There was no allegation of common injury, danger, obstruction, or annoyance to the public or to persons exercising any public right—elements that are foundational to the offence. In their absence, the invocation of the provision was rendered legally unsustainable.

With respect to Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, the court held that even if the allegations in the FIR were accepted in toto, the statutory contours of publication or transmission of obscene material in electronic form were not satisfied. The continuation of the criminal proceedings, the court concluded, would amount to an abuse of the process of law.

Tags: